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JUDICIAL SECRECY AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY:
MAX WEBER REVISITED
JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER,* LARRY L. BERGt

and JUSTIN

J. GREEN*"

T he Supreme Court of the United States and its attentive publicthe members of the bar, the press, and the law faculties and
journal writing students-are currently engaged in a reappraisal of
the norms of Court behavior. The contemporary reappraisal is in
part a continuation of the controversies surrounding the Fortas,
Haynesworth and Carswell nominations. By late 1972 and early 1973,
considerable attention had been focused upon judicial disqualification
issues. Some of these have centered upon the matter of judicial secrecy,
both internal and relating to off-the-bench behavior. For example, the
participation of Justice Lewis Powell in an antitrust suit against
Falstaff Brewing Corporation was criticized or discussed in the press
in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Powell disqualified himself after press criticism and the disclosure that he owned 880 shares
(worth $55,000) in a competitor, Anheuser-Busch, which might profit
if Falstaff lost the suit.' The issue of full disclosure of outside sources
of judicial income is, of course, merely one of a number of issues
involving institutional norms and secrecy which have precipitated
public controversy.2
It is the purpose of this article to consider the issues relating to
the institutional norms-especially ethical norms requiring public
disclosure of off-the-bench relationships-which may support the
power and influence of the Supreme Court in its constitutional role
as definitive interpretor of the boundaries of federalism and separation of powers. Of special relevance to this inquiry is the assessment
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1. Matthews, Justices Must Decide Own Ethics: Supreme Court Justices Face
DisqualificationDilemma, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1972, § K, at 1, col. 5.
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and analysis of institutional stability. The contributions of major
European and American theorists and researchers concerning the
linkage between institutional norms and the stability of both specific
political institutions and total political systems are relevant to this
analysis.
The argument that the legitimization of the collective decisionmaking process cannot be performed unless the judiciary itself possesses
an "image of legitimacy" was presented with irrefutable buttressing
evidence by Gerald Jordan. The occasion was his excellent comparative study of the Dutch and American judicial systems in crisis in the
World War II and Civil War eras, respectively. The image of legitimacy, argued Jordan, "is directly dependent upon persistent and cohesive political support of sufficient intensity and continuity to insure
that the Court's decisions are accepted as final, as the collective decisions of society." 3 Jordan did not discuss the theoretical bases for his
assumptions, nor did he relate these assumptions to a detailed analysis
of the institutional norms, such as avoidance of conflict of interest,
which may create or maintain a favorable or supportive "image."
However, Walter Murphy, in his Elements of Judicial Strategy, argued
cogently for recognition of the linkage between institutional prestige
and judicial power. In Murphy's analysis:
Prestige is an important source of judicial power. When combined
with professional reputation it can also become an important instrument of judicial power. Prestige refers to the Court's hold on popular
esteem. Reputation refers to the judgment of other government officials about the skill and determination with which the Justices use
their power in their own advantage or that of the policies they are
supporting. Since public officials are likely to have been brought up
to respect the judiciary as an institution, they are also likely to share
to some extent the widespread belief that they ought to obey Supreme Court decisions. When the Justices can reinforce this feeling
of obligations with professional respect for their abilities and determination, they have fashioned a very potent weapon to secure
people who have the physobedience and cooperation from the very
4
ical power to ignore or even defy them.
Two of Murphy's assumptions-that prestige and professional
reputation are significant sources of judicial power and that public
3. Address by Gerald Jordan, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Sept. 9, 1960.
4. W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 19 (1954).
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officials are likely to have a sense of respect for the Court derived from
their early political socialization-shall be investigated, the first from
the perspective of broad institutional theoretical considerations, the
second with respect to empirical evidence. Two of the great European
theorists, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, contributed significantly
to the analysis of the characteristics of social and political institutions
which insure the stability or continuity of entire political systems.
Weber's studies of the institutionalization of authority have been
characterized as constituting "the most highly developed and broadly
applicable conceptual scheme in any comparable field which is available, not only in the specifically sociological literature, but in that of
social science as a whole." 5 Whether or not one accepts Talcott Parsons' estimate of Weber's conceptual contributions, Weber's identification of the three modem bases of legitimacy-legality, formally
correct rules, and accepted procedure-does provide an appropriate
starting point for analysis of the relationship of the norms of the
Supreme Court and its systems maintenance role in the American
political system.
Weber's general analysis of the institutionalization of authority
has influenced many American scholars, political scientists as well as
sociologists. In describing a conceptual framework for the investigation of the institutionalization of the United States House of Representatives, Nelson Polsby identified the three major characteristics
of institutionalized organizations: (1) the establishment and maintenance of boundaries which differentiate a particular institution from
others; (2) the specialization of functions within the institution; and
(3) the evolution of standardized institutional procedures and ethical norms. Of the third of these characteristics, Polsby wrote: "Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and
nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior." 7
Allan Kornberg, investigating the institutional significance of
standards of ethical conduct, described the functions served by "the
rules of the game" in the Canadian House of Commons as follows:
"(1) to expedite the flow of legislative business, (2) to channel and
5. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
Parsons transl. 1947).

ECONOMIC

ORGANIZATION

77 (T.

6. Id. at 131.
7. Polsby, The Institutionalizationof the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 Am.
Por.. Smt. REv. 144, 145 (1968).
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mitigate conflict, (3) to defend members against external criticism."
The latter, argued Kornberg, tended "to promote legislative solidarity
regardless of party, and establish norms designed to discourage behavior which might bring the system and its members under attack
from outsiders. 9
American scholars have indeed described the institutional norms
which are generally considered basic to the reputation for fairness
that is considered fundamental to a properly functioning legal system. But most judicial commentators fail to relate these institutional
attributes to a broader systems-persistence theoretical framework, and
most treat lightly the serious problems of self-disqualification and
financial conflict of interest. Karl Llewellyn, the noted legal realist,
described these norms as comprising an interrelated "craft tradition":
[I]n the craft-tradition of the appellate courts, we find a number of
attributes . . .which are seldom phrased. ... [These are] effort at

"impartiality"; effort to keep the mind open till both sides have been
heard; effort to dissociate the "true essence" of the controversy from
accidents of person, personality and the like; avoidance of a case
in which a judge is or may be thought personally "interested." ...
Some portion of this is institutionalized. "Independence of the judiciary" . . . and nonreduceability of salaries, seek both to make such

"judicial" conduct possible and to further it. Rules of law against
bribery, practices set against "influence," loose but useful practices
of self-disqualification, even looser but still recognizable practices
about judicial manners, the disciplinary pressure of phrasing an explanation of a decision in a published opinion, the policing power of
possible open dissent by any member of the court who may see or feel
outrage-these form a gap-filled hedge to mark and to half-police the
tradition."0
Llewellyn, like most modern American legal scholars, recognized the
looseness of the safeguards, but did not feel impelled to discuss either
the necessity for stronger safeguards or the relationship between institutional reputation and institutional norms.
Prevalent in the writings of many contemporary Supreme Court
commentators is the tendency to treat issues relating to institutional
norms as matters which are largely internalized within the judiciary
8. Kornberg, The Rules of the Game in the Canadian House of Commons, 26 3.
POL. 358, 359 (1964).
9. Id. at 361.
10. Llewellyn, The American Common Law Tradition and American Democracy,
1 3. LEGAL & POL. SOcIOLOGy 14, 32 (1942).
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or through interaction between the Court and the American Bar Association. The contemporary discussion of norms of judicial behavior
was stimulated by the controversy over Justice Abe Fortas' off-thebench relationship with the Wolfson Foundation and the ensuing
debate in the Senate. As a result, on June 10, 1969, Chief Justice Earl
Warren announced that the Judicial Conference of the United States
had limited outside income to those items approved by the judicial
council for each circuit and made a matter of public record. In addition each judge was required to file a statement of assets and income.
The approval requirement was suspended on October 31, 1969, pending completion of the ABA Special Study Committee's work. In December, 1969, the new Chief Justice, Warren Burger, appointed an
Interim Advisory Committee to deal with the issue. The close relationship of the federal judiciary and the ABA is underscored by the
history of the canons. The original Canons of Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association were adopted in 1924. Although they were
modified slightly in 1933, 1937, 1950, and 1952, they were fundamentally unchanged for decades. A reappraisal was made by a Special ABA
Committee appointed by ABA President Bernard Segal in August
1969.11
Judge Irving Kaufman, a member of the special Committee on
Standards of Judicial Conduct, recognized that American judges, under
21
the old canons, were viewed as "a body of self-regulating individuals."'
He chose to contrast the American tradition with that of the German
system, thus emphasizing the influence of the mode of selection of
judges as one aspect of American judicial independence. In Kaufman's
words "[r]ather than selecting them through written or oral examinations and advancement under a rigid civil service system, we have
generally followed the practice of choosing members of the bar, hope13
fully of some stature, and elevating them to the bench."'
Judge Kaufman urged that the principle of self-regulation of
judicial disqualification issues be continued. Kaufnan's frame of
reference was centered primarily upon considerations deemed im11. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

3, 7 (1970).

12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. Judge Kaufman noted that the California Supreme Court in
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 47
had "held that a California statute requiring public office holders (including
to file annual statements of investments, was an overbroad invasion of the right of
and therefore unconstitutional." Kaufman, supra note 11, at 7 n.28.

871

City of
(1970),
judges)
privacy,
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portant by judges themselves or by leaders of the organized bar. Indeed the tendency to treat the institutional norms of the Supreme
Court from a frame of reference similar to Judge Kaufman's is rather
typical of legal professional and scholarly commentary. While there is
no scarcity of articles documenting the nature of the problem, 14 there
is little evidence that the problem has been thoroughly assessed from
the perspective of the Supreme Court's legitimacy and its system
maintenance role. It is the major thesis of this article that modification and strengthening of the institutional norms-especially ending
secrecy in the private financial relations of the federal justices and
judges-must be considered from this virtually ignored perspective.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence to support this recommendation may be found by reexamining the validity of the hypothesis which is most frequently invoked when questions relating to public
or political attitudes toward the Court are discussed. As Walter Murphy had put it, "since public officials are likely to have been brought
up to respect the judiciary as an institution, they are also likely to
share the widespread belief, that they ought to obey Supreme Court
decisions."' 5 The essentials of the hypothesis, which comprises the conventional wisdom regarding the basis of public and professional
"reverence" for the Court, are (1) the assumption that knowledge of
the nature and purposes of the Supreme Court is acquired through a
process of pre-adult political socialization, and (2) that there is a
"widespread" belief that Supreme Court decisions ought to be obeyed.
Murphy's emphasis upon "widespread" public support finds its corollary in the belief or assumption that legal professionals are especially
supportive. Thus Glendon Schubert stated: "Many congressmen are
lawyers; and the argument that proponents of the amendatory bill
are showing disrespect for the highest court in the land is an effective one."' 6
If these interrelated hypotheses are correct, ending secrecy in
off-the-bench financial transactions and strengthening other institu14. Law and Contemporary Problems published several excellent articles which
provided specific data illustrating the need to make changes regarding conflict of
interest among justices and judges. These include Frank, Disqualification of Judges in
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1970); McKay, The judiciary
and Non-judicial Activities, id. at 43; and White, To Have or Not To Have-Conflicts
of Interests and FinancialPlanningfor Judges, id. at 202.
15. W. MURPHY, supra note 4.

16. G.

SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICs

872

257-58 (1964).
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tional norms of the Supreme Court presumably would be unnecessary
(from the frame of reference of institutional legitimacy and systemsmaintenance). Conversely, if these hypotheses are invalid, there would
be a strong basis for the adoption of what Weber referred to as
"formally correct rules" and "accepted procedures" 17 regarding these
institutional norms.
In historic perspective, the verdict of conventional historians
stresses the ascendancy of the judiciaries in relation to the legislatures.
James Willard Hurst summed up this interpretation as follows:
The years from 1750 to 1820 offered legislators a chance to become
the principal lawmakers for the nation as a whole and also for the
states . . .as we go on . . .the story of the legislature becomes
largely negative in the telling.' 8
Hurst pointed out that the legislature began, in the post-colonial period, with "an impressive trinity of advantages."' 19 These were (1) its
legitimacy in public opinion, (2) its broad grant of constitutional
authority, and (3) its power as "the grand inquest of the nation
and states to inquire into matters of public concern." 20 Yet by the
1870's, the courts emerged as major influences. As Hurst put it, "between 1820 and 1890 the judges were already taking the initiative in
lawmaking." 21 He also stressed that "through the injunction and the
receivership, judges anticipated the later role of executive and administrative agencies. "22 As this comment indicated, Hurst concluded
that initiative finally passed to the executive and administrative
2
branches. 3
The verdict of conventional historians concerning the relative
positions of the political institutions of the nineteenth century could
not, of course, be validated on the basis of public opinion surveys.
In the 1960's and 1970's, however, empirical data interpreted by often
ingenious utilization of the language of measurement provided the
basis for contemporary testing of the hypotheses stated by Walter
Murphy and Glendon Schubert in the 1950's and early 1960's. Joseph
Tanenhaus and Walter Murphy completed a comprehensive mapping
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

M. WEBER, supra note 5, at 131.
J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 23-24, 85.

r

LAW

23 (1950).
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investigation of public opinion and the Supreme Court in the latter
part of the 1960's. 24 Their findings concerning the visibility of and
public perceptions of the role of the Supreme Court would, at a preliminary level, implicitly contradict the hypothesis based on the alleged consequences of early political socialization. Over one third
(34.7 percent) of a 1966 national sample did not know what the
major role of the Supreme Court was. 25 Another quarter of the sample
(25.6 percent) did not identify its major constitutional responsibilities. 26 Data from the same 1966 sample indicate that the largest group
responding to a like/dislike question was negatively disposed toward the
Supreme Court-nearly 32 percent (31.7) were negatively disposed
toward the Supreme Court, outnumbering those positively disposed by
over 3 to 1 (9.5 percent) .27 Nearly 54 percent (53.8) indicated that
they didn't know or would not respond to specific support questions. 28
The Murphy-Tanenhaus data on diffuse support (defined as "the degree to which the Supreme Court is thought to carry out its overall responsibilities in an impartial and competent fashion") did indicate
stronger Court support-37 percent positive to 21.7 percent negative
with 41.3 undetermined or uncommitted. 29 While the authors interpreted this as indicating that "the Court still retains a substantial
reservoir of diffuse support," it is not clear that the Court would be
in a strong position in the event that a major institutional conflict
with Congress or the President were to occur. Not only is the level
of diffuse support below 40 percent; under certain circumstances,
diffuse support for the Supreme Court is likely to diminish when
knowledge of specific Supreme Court actions increases. Utilizing data
from the 1966 national sample, Murphy and Tanenhaus found that
for black respondents a unit change (increase) in Court knowledge
is associated with a +45 change in diffuse support for the Supreme
Court. Conversely, a unit change (increase) in Court knowledge for
Southern whites is associated with a -. 38 change in diffuse supporta 0
These findings do not answer every question related to the issue
24. Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:
A PreliminaryMapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitimation of Regime Changes,
in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARcH 276 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 287, 290.
28. Id. at 287.
29. Id. at 290.
30. W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIc LA 203 (1972).
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whether early political socialization of Americans contributes significantly to an alleged sense of public obligation to obey or uphold the
Supreme Court, but it casts considerable doubt upon the broad assumption and indicates that the issues surrounding this assumption
are rather complex.
This tentative conclusion is buttressed by the investigations of
Edward Muller concerning the correlates and consequences of beliefs
in the legitimacy of regime structures. Utilizing a sample of students
enrolled in introductory political science courses and a special group
which had been arrested in an anti-war demonstration (all in 1968),
Muller found that in contrast to Congress, the Supreme Court is perceived as "a somewhat remote, perhaps not even especially relevant,
institution." 3' 1 Of far greater consequences for the purposes of this
analysis. Muller found that "Congress legitimacy appears to be the
only variable capable of independently producing change in legitimacy
82
sentiments directed toward the Supreme Court as an institution."
If, as Muller's exploratory data suggests, the public perceptions of
Supreme Court legitimacy are derivative, in part, from Congress
legitimacy, do congressional attitudes as demonstrated by roll call
behavior (or other manifestations) assume greater importance in contemporary assessments of the relative influence of these institutions?
An affirmative answer is not only indicated; it is manifest that a
concomitant question concerning the nature of congressional responses is in order.
Data reported by the authors in three earlier studies are relevant
to this question. Many historians as well as political scientists have
accepted the assumption that the Supreme Court as an institution is
revered by the American public as well as by a majority of members of
Congress. The "Court packing" controversy of the 1930's is frequently
cited to support this contention. An initial investigation of 147 Courtoriented roll calls in the House and the Senate in the 79th through
90th Congresses (1945-1968) was conducted to determine the extent
to which congressmen supported the Supreme Court. If congressmen
in general revere the Court, and lawyer-congressmen in particular
possess, through professional socialization, an unusual sense of respect
for the Supreme Court, it may be assumed that the variables which
31. Muller, Correlates and Consequences of Beliefs in the Legitimacy of Regime
Structures, 14 MDWEST J. POL. SC. 392 (1970).
32. Id. at 406-07.
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ordinarily influence congressional voting behavior would be considerably less efficacious when judicially-oriented legislation was being
voted upon than under other roll call circumstances. Do lawyer-legislators deviate from their "normal" voting behavior patterns to consistently defend the Court? Do congressmen abandon their partisan
voting tendencies when Court-oriented legislation is acted upon? Do
congressmen who ordinarily oppose or support the Conservative Coalition continue to do so when legislation relating to the Supreme
Court is before the House or Senate?
In this investigation (omitting temporarily the special treatment
of lawyer-legislators), an examination was first made of the ten roll
calls in the House of Representatives and the twenty-one roll calls
in the Senate which were distinctly attacks on the Court as an institution. Secondly, recognizing that a discernible distinction can be made
between congressional attitudes toward the Supreme Court regarding
ordinary legislative reversals of statutory interpretations and extraordinary actions which, in substance, would weaken the Court as an
institution, the reversals of statutory interpretations were treated
separately. The data summarized in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate that
while there were differences in Supreme Court support levels bet3veen the House and the Senate, the divisions reflected the typical
voting patterns of the era. Thus the partisan divisions between Democrats and Republicans were modified considerably by Conservative

TABLE 1
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN
AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES
SUPPORTING THE COURT ON ROLL CALLS
DIRECTLY ATTACKING THE COURT OR
SEEKING TO CURB THE COURT
Party

Average Percentage
(ten roll calls)

Democratic
55.4%

Republican
19.2%

Northern
Democratic
82.3%
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Coalition voting patterns. This is substantiated in Tables 5 and 6
which summarize Rice Index of Cohesion scores in House and Senate
statutory reversal cases. 33 The Conservative Coalition divisions and
partisan conflicts were indeed very similar to the roll call divisions on
34
civil rights and social welfare issues during the post World War II era.

TABLE 2
THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUB;
LICAN, AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS
SUPPORTING THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL
CALLS ON LEGISLATION TO CURB OR
DIRECTLY ATTACK THE COURT
Party

Average Percentage.
(21 roll calls)

Democratic

Republican

Northern
Democratic

60.0%_

37.3%

83.0%

TABLE 3
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN
AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES
SUPPORTING THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL
CALLS TO MODIFY OR REVERSE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
Party
Democratic

Average Percentage
(35 roll calls)

48.1%

Republican
13.0%

33. J. SCHMIDHAUSER & L. BERG, supra note 2, at 134-84.
34. Compare voting patterns analyzed in D. MAYHEW,
CONGRESSMEN:

1962 (1966).

THE DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN

DEMOCRATS

Northern
Democratic
65.3%

PARTY LOYALTY AMONG
AND REPUBLICANS 1947-
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Max Weber and another influential European social theorist,
Emile Durkheim, each emphasized, albeit from different analytical
perspectives, the significant role of law as a profession and in politics. Durkheim, in particular, undertook a comprehensive analysis of
the relationship of professions, their internal characteristics, and their
interrelationship to the institutions of government. He hypothesized
that professions which have "a public character," notably "the army,
education, the Law . . ." are closely associated with certain agencies
of government and possess a high degree of cohesiveness with respect
to their professional goals, goals which are often related in some manner to public purposes.3 5 Presumably certain professional norms could
influence the behavior of legal professionals with respect to legal or
political institutions. Indeed, in the modern American context, it
might be argued that despite the impact of, in David Truman's characterization, "the centrifugal effects of specialized practice and wide
income differentials,"' 6 the American legal profession purportedly
identifies a limited number of norms as fundamental to their profession. With respect to governmental institutions, virtually every group

TABLE 4
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN
AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS SUPPORTING
THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS ATTEMPTING
TO MODIFY OR REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Party

Average Percentage
(71 roll calls)

Democratic

Republican

Northern
Democratic

55.4%

24.2%

72.3%

8-9 (1958).
96 (1967). See especially the
excellent study of the "Missouri" plan of judicial reform in R. WATSON & R. DOWNING,
35. E.

36. D.

DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS
TRUMAN,

THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

THE POLITICS OF BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 19-48, 75-110 (1969).
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within the legal profession asserts (or at least gives lip service to) the
profession's obligation to maintain the integrity of the courts. Indeed,
this norm is reinforced not only by the canons of professional ethics,
but also by the tradition which describes an attorney as an officer of
the court and by frequent invocation by the courts themselves.
The editors of American Jurisprudenceindicated that the role of
an attorney as an officer of the court is fairly explicit-while the lawyer is not a "public officer" in an official sense, he "must maintain a

TABLE 5
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES
ON ROLL CALLS TO REVERSE OR MODIFY SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
Party

Rice Index
(35 roll calls)

Democratic

Republican

Northern
Democratic

23.1

70.0

42.2

TABLE 6
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS ON
ROLL CALLS MODIFYING OR REVERSING
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Party

Rice Index
(71 roll calls)

Democratic

Republican

Northern
Democratic

33.4

60.6

59.3
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respectful and courteous attitude toward" the courts.37 This imperative is frequently reiterated by the courts in a very direct manner. As
a Nevada court stated: "It is the special duty and obligation of members of the bar to protect the good name of the courts against illfounded and unwarranted attacks." 38 Specifically referring to the
lawyer's obligation to the courts, the Canons of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association are described as undertaking "to
codify the traditions and practice recognized over the centuries as
part of the common law with respect to lawyers' obligations."3 0 This
anoihgv~ry explicit:.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
Judges, not being wholly free -to defend themselves, are peculiarly
entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism
and clamor .... 40
The intimate relationship between the organized bar and state and
federal judicial systems is also constantly reinforced by the development of reciprocal obligations such as the traditional advisory role
fulfilled by the bar regarding modification of judicial rules. 41 Thus
lawyers not only are professionally socialized to maintain respect for
the courts, but they also may presumably be motivated to maintain a
system within which they enjoy a preferred status.
Commonly held assumptions about the consequences of legal
professionalism for either the-stability- of judicial systems or the behavior of lawyer legislators in contested roll call situations are presumably founded upon this often reiterated norm of professional responsibility toward the courts. If the traditional obligation of the
legal profession to respect, assist, and protect the judiciary is of compelling influence, it would be difficult to conceive of situations in
which the Supreme Court would be seriously endangered by congressional attacks. This presumably would follow because the House of
Representatives and Senate, in modern times, have had, on the basis
of comparative cross-national and intra-national criteria, an "extra37. 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 4 (1963).
38. Id. at n.1, citing In re Breen, 30 Nev. 164, 93 P. 997 (1908).
39. 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 4 n.1 (1963).
40. Ams. JUR. 2d DEss BooK 222 (1962).
41. See, e.g., Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United

States, 346 U.S. 945 (1954).
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ordinary over-representation of lawyers." 42 For the period investigated in this research report, 1937-68, the number of lawyer-legislators in both the House and the Senate was not only significantly high
but the high proportions remained relatively stable. The mean percentage of House lawyer-legislators was 57 percent, varying from 55
percent to 59 percent. In the Senate the mean percentage was 66 percent, fluctuating between 57 percent in the 83rd Congress and 74 percent in the 75th Congress.43 Lawyers not only maintained large majorities in each session, but also monopolized the key committees from
which legislation affecting the status of the Supreme Court would, in
most instances, originate-the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Lawyer-legislators were not only present in large numbers, but
had, historically, acquired a privileged status-that of monopolistic
control of the House and Senate committees which dealt most directly with matters likely to affect the status of the legal profession and
the courts before which members of the legal profession practiced.
The members of these two committees obviously were in a position
to exercise unusual influence in situations where the sanctity of the
Supreme Court was at stake.
A summary of the computed lawyer/non-lawyer scores in Figures IA and lB indicate that the pro-Court voting behavior of lawyer
legislators in both the House and the Senate did not differ significantly
from that of non-lawyer legislators. Similarly a more detailed examination of the voting behavior of members of the lawyer-monopoly committees (Judiciary) of the House and Senate was made separating
Type 1 (Court curbing) and Type 2 (reversal of statutory interpretation) roll calls. The results were identical in Figures 2A-2D, with
no significant difference between lawyer-legislators who served on
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and all other members
of the respective chambers.
42. For cross-national comparisons see Patterson, ComparativeLegislative Behavior:
A Review Essay, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 599, 604 (1968); Pedersen, Lawyers in
Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures, in COMiPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH 27 (S. Patterson & J. Wahlke eds. 1972).
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CONCLUSION

In short, the conventional wisdom that assumed and continues
to assume that lawyer legislators will exhibit, in voting behavior, an
attitude of support and reverence for the Supreme Court based upon
professional socialization is not supported by the evidence. Thus the
entire subject of the norms of institutional behavior of the Supreme Court-especially the issues involving secrecy and conflict of
interest-assumes far greater importance. Contextually, the evidence
provided suggests that the resolution of judicial norm issues can not,
realistically, be treated as if they were merely of significance to the
justices or judges themselves or of importance to the more interested
or attentive leaders of the organized bar. Institutional norms are intimately related to the basic characteristics identified by Max Weber,
Emile Durkheim, and a small number of American scholars as fundamental to institutional legitimacy and system maintenance itself. Full
recognition of this important dimension of the problem is a vital
precondition of the intelligent development of a more relevant change.

